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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
IN DISTRICT COURT 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Constitution 
Article VIII, section 4, and Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-2-2(3)(j). 
The proceedings below consist of plaintiffs1 class 
action seeking: (1) an order of the court enjoining defendant 
(the "Board") from enforcing the Board's order of January 19, 
1988 (the "Order"), or otherwise preventing certain children 
of plaintiffs and other students similarly situated from 
attending the high school of their choice or closest to their 
places of residence in the Salt Lake City School District (the 
"District"), after taking into account school capacities and 
natural physical barriers; (2) a declaratory judgment 
determining that the Order is void and of no effect because 
the Order is unconstitutional and is ultra vires the powers of 
the Board/ (3) an order of the court directing notice to the 
Board of the particulars in which the Order violates the Utah 
Constitution and exceeds the powers of the Board as granted by 
the statutes of the State of Utah, and giving the Board a 
reasonable opportunity to rescind the Order and develop a 
voluntary plan consistent with Utah law/ and (4) for an order 
of the court granting plaintiffs judgment against the Board for 
a reasonable sum for the use and benefit of plaintiffs' 
attorneys, and for costs incurred herein. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review on this appeal are as 
follows: 
A. Whether the Order denies plaintiffs' their liberty 
to control the education of their children, which denial is 
contrary to the provisions of Utah Constitution Article I, 
section 7; 
B. Whether the Order is unconstitutional as contrary 
to the provisions of Utah Constitution Article X, section 8 
prohibiting a partisan test or qualification for admission or 
attendance in the public high schools of Salt Lake City, Utah; 
and 
C. Whether the Order is unlawful because it is ultra 
vires the enumerated powers conferred on the Board by former 
Section 53-6-20, Utah Code Ann. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The determinative provisions of the Utah Constitution, 
and the determinative statutes of the State of Utah read 
verbatim as follows: 
In 1988 Title 53 was recodified and replaced by Title 53A. 
The section applicable to this action is 53-6-20, which section 
as amended has now been designated as section 53A-3-402. In 
this brief Plaintiffs will refer to the old section 53-6-20 
which was in effect at the time the Order was adopted by the 
Board on January 19, 1988. 
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UTAH CONSTIT. ARTICLE I, SECTION 1. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law* 
UTAH CONSTIT. ARTICLE X, SECTION 8. 
No religious or partisan test or 
qualification shall be required as a 
condition of employment, admission, or 
attendance in the state's education systems. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 53-6-20, 
Every school board may: 
(1) spend minimum school program funds for 
programs and activities for which the State 
Board of Education has established minimum 
standards or rules under Section 53-2-12.1/ 
(2) purchase, sell, and make improvements 
on school sites, buildings, and equipment 
and construct, erect, and furnish school 
buildings. School sites or buildings may 
only be conveyed or sold on board resolution 
affirmed by at least two-thirds of the 
members; 
(3) participate in the joint construction 
or operation of a school attended by 
children in the district and children 
residing in adjoining districts either 
within or outside the state. The agreement 
for joint operation or construction of a 
school shall be signed by the president of 
the board of each participating district, 
include a mutually agreed upon pro rata 
cost, and be filed with the State Board of 
Education; 
(4) establish, locate, and maintain 
kindergarten, elementary, secondary, and 
vocational schools. Children seeking to 
enter school must be at least five years of 
age before September 2, of the year in which 
admission is sought; 
(5) establish and support school libraries 
and authorize, and pay for out of district 
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funds, a compilation of the history of the 
district; 
(6) collect damages for the loss, injury, 
or destruction of school property; 
(7) engage in guidance and counseling 
services for children and their parents 
prior to enrollment of the children in 
school; 
(8) apply for, receive, and administer 
funds made available through the programs of 
the Federal Government. Federal funds are 
not considered funds within the school 
district budget under chapter 20 of Title 
53 • Federal funds are expended for the 
purposes for which they are received and are 
accounted for by the Board. 
(9) organize school safety patrols and 
adopt rules under which the patrols promote 
student safety. A student appointed to a 
safety patrol shall be age 11 or over, or 
age ten or over in elementary schools that 
do not include a sixth grade, and shall have 
written parental consent for the 
appointment. Safety patrol members shall 
not direct vehicular traffic or be stationed 
in the portion of the highway intended for 
vehicular traffic use. No liability shall 
attach either to the school district, the 
board of education, an individual board 
member, a parent of a safety patrol member, 
an authorized volunteer assisting the 
program, or other school authority by virtue 
of the organization, maintenance, or 
operation of a school safety patrol; 
(10) on its own behalf, or on behalf of an 
educational institution for which the board 
is the direct governing body, accept private 
grants, loans, gifts, endowments, devises or 
bequests which are made for educational 
purposes. These contributions are not 
subject to appropriation by the Legislature; 
(11) appoint and fix the compensation of a 
compliance officer to issue citations for 
violations of Subsection 76-10-105(2). A 
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person may not be appointed to serve as a 
compliance officer without the person's 
consent. A teacher or student may not be 
appointed as a compliance officer. 
(12) adopt bylaws and rules for its own 
procedures/ 
(13) make and enforce rules necessary for 
the control and management of the district 
schools. All board rules and policies shall 
be in writing, filed, and referenced for 
public access; and 
(14) do all things necessary for the 
maintenance, prosperity, and success of the 
schools and the promotion of education. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, acting for themselves and all others 
similarly situated, commenced this class action on March 4, 
1988 to nullify the effect of the Order, which Order became 
effective in August 1988. Pursuant to the Order certain 
children of plaintiffs and other high school students residing 
in Salt Lake City, Utah are denied access to the Salt Lake City 
high school of their choice and located in their respective 
neighborhoods, and are transported by school bus each school 
day from the area served by the high school in their respective 
neighborhoods to another high school not in closest proximity 
to where they reside. 
The Board admits that the students residing in the 
various neighborhoods denied access to the high school of their 
choice and closest to them, were selected for assignment and 
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transport to another high school in Salt Lake City because of 
their ethnic status, their academic achievement scores and the 
socio-economic classes of the parents and students involved. 
However, the Board contends that under Utah law the Board has 
the plenary power to adopt and enforce the Order regardless of 
its reasons for determining which student was selected for 
mandatory assignment to which high school. 
Although originally filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, because of the federal 
predicates described in the complaint, the Board removed the 
case to the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah. Following consideration there of the Board's motion to 
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment, and 
plaintiffs" cross-motion for summary judgment, the Honorable 
Judge David K. Winder dismissed all federal claims but refused 
to rule on plaintiffs1 claims grounded on the Utah Constitution 
and other Utah state law. Upon the federal court's remand to 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, and after considering 
the parties cross-motions for summary judgment, the Honorable 
Scott Daniels granted the Board's motion for summary judgment 
and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Summary 
judgment to that effect was entered on December 30, 1988, from 
which summary judgment this appeal is taken. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no genuine issue as to any of the following 
material facts* All references in this Brief of Appellants are 
to pages in the original papers and exhibits contained in the 
record on appeal as contemplated by R. Utah S. Ct. 11(b) and 
24(e). Copies of the Order and Judge Daniels1 Memorandum 
Decision are included in the Addendum. 
1. The named plaintiffs are the parents of children 
currently enrolled in one or more schools in the District. 
(See paragraph 3 on page 131.) 
2. The Board is the legal entity created to 
administer the affairs of the District. (See paragraph 1 on 
page 131.) 
3. Prior to January 19, 1988, there were four high 
schools in the District, namely, in alphabetical order, East, 
Highland, South and West. (See pages 643-645, 688.) 
4. Prior to January 19, 1988, the Board decided to 
close South High at the conclusion of the 1987-1988 school 
year. (See pages 643-645.) 
5. On January 19, 1988, by a bare majority vote of 
four to three, the Board made a formal decision constituting 
the Order, pursuant to which Order the Board established 
attendance boundaries for high school students residing in the 
District who would be attending the remaining three high 
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schools, East, Highland and West, during the 1988-1989 school 
year and thereafter. (See pages 643-645, 688.) 
6. The boundaries established by the Order are 
"closed boundaries" in the sense that the high school students 
residing in the District are required to attend a designated 
high school, unless, upon a showing of special circumstances, a 
particular student is permitted to do otherwise by the 
District. (See paragraphs 22 and 23 on pages 147 and 148, and 
pages 739-740.) 
7. The purpose and effect of the Order is to 
"gerrymander" the District's high school attendance boundaries 
so that students represented by plaintiffs are prevented from 
attending the high school of their choice, in their 
neighborhood or in nearest proximity to them. (See pages 546, 
730, 772, 773, 776, 777.) 
8. As a result of the Order, certain of the high 
school students residing in the Euclid area in the District 
whose places of residence prior to the Order were located 
within the West High attendance boundary, and who currently 
live within walking distance of West High, are now denied 
admission to or attendance at West High, and such students have 
been eliminated from the West High student body because a high 
percentage of such students are low academic achievers, are 
members of ethnic minorities, and they and their families are 
perceived by a majority of the Board to be members of a low 
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social and economic class of people. (See pages 651-655, 665, 
688.) 
9. As a result of the Order, certain high school 
students residing within the area immediately south of the 
Euclid area of the District, whose places of residence prior to 
the Order were located within the South High attendance 
boundary, and who currently live within walking distance of 
West High, are now denied admission to or attendance at West 
High, and such students have been denied membership in the West 
High student body because a high percentage of such students 
are low academic achievers, are members of ethnic minorities, 
and they and their families are perceived by a majority of the 
Board to be members of a low social and economic class of 
people. (See pages 665, 667-669, 688.) 
10. As a result of the Order, certain of the high 
school students residing within the Federal Heights area and 
the Avenues area of the District, whose places of residence 
prior to the Order were located within the East High attendance 
boundary, and who currently live within walking distance of 
East High, are now denied admission to or attendance at East 
High, and such students have been eliminated from the East High 
student body because a high percentage of such students are 
high academic achievers, are not members of ethnic minorities, 
and they and their families are perceived by a majority of the 
Board to be members of a high social and economic class of 
people. (See pages 648-651, 662-665, 688.) 
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11 • The students described in the next three 
preceding paragraphs are not within walking distance of the 
high school where they are required to attend by the Order, and 
each school day, at extra expense to the District, such 
students are bussed across Salt Lake City to a high school not 
closest or most convenient to them. (See pages 680-685, 
704-708, 710-715.) 
12. As a result of the Order, certain of the high 
school students residing within the 13th and 17th South area of 
the District, whose places of residence prior to the Order were 
in the Highland High attendance boundary, and who are currently 
living within walking distance of Highland High, are now denied 
admission to or attendance at Highland High, and such students 
have been eliminated from the Highland High student body 
because a high percentage of such students are high academic 
achievers, are not members of ethnic minorities, and they and 
their families are perceived by a majority of the Board to be 
members of a high social and economic class of people. (See 
pages 646-648, 665, 688.) 
13. The Order was designed to make West High a 
"better school" by denying students residing in the the Euclid 
area and students residing in the area immediately south of the 
Euclid area, access to West High (their school of choice and 
closest to them), while at the same time denying the Federal 
Heights area students and the Avenues area students access to 
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East High, and the 13th South and 17th South area students 
access to Highland High* (See pages 657-661, 665, 669-672, 
688,) 
14. None of the high schools in the District is or 
ever has been "segregated*" (See pages 803-807*) 
15. The Order is not "necessary" to enable the Board 
to discharge any of its duties as specified in Utah Code Ann. 
Section 53-6-20. (See pages 617-627, 661, 662, 765, 766, 852, 
853. ) 
16. The three high schools in the District still 
operating following the closure of South High can operate with 
all students attending the school in nearest proximity to them, 
and with enrollments that are unbalanced between the schools on 
the basis of academic achievement or racial status. (See pages 
661, 662.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Order is unconstitutional and therefore should 
be considered of no force and effect because the Order denies 
plaintiffs their liberty to control the education of their 
children, which liberty is protected by the due process clause 
found in Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Several persuasive federal Supreme Court decisions have 
declared that such rights are among those contemplated by the 
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concept of "liberty" contained in both the federal and Utah 
constitutions. In the present case, the Order Gerrymandered 
the high school boundaries within the District for the same 
reasons that have historically condemned Gerrymandering — the 
failure to treat everyone impartially by taking rights from one 
group and giving special advantages to others. 
II. The Order is unconstitutional and therefore 
should be considered of no force and effect because the Order 
subjects certain students in the District to partisan tests or 
qualifications for access to a certain high school, all in 
violation of Article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution. By 
definition, partisan tests include tests that divide school 
patrons for reasons of bias, prejudice (discrimination), 
one-sided allegiance and other unreasonable considerations. 
Such unfavorable tests resulting in the Order included whether 
the students resided in a neighborhood of high or low academic 
achievers; whether the students resided in a neighborhood with 
a proportionally high or low number of minority residents; 
whether the students resided in a neighborhood of a high or low 
socio-economic class of people; or whether the students resided 
in a neighborhood whose exclusion from a particular school was 
perceived to be in the best interests of West High. 
III. The Order is illegal and therefore should be 
considered of no force and effect because the Order is not 
within the competency of the Board because the Order exceeds 
enumerated powers conferred on the Board by Utah Code Ann. 
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Section 53-6-20 and the whole Utah statutory scheme governing 
Utah's public schools* More particularly, the Order is not 
"necessary" as required by subsection (14) of Section 53-6-20 
pursuant to the doctrine ejusdem jeneris; granting the Board 
plenary power pursuant to subsection (14) ignores the 
fundamental rights of parents to make reasonable choices in the 
education of their children, while granting boards of education 
the right to make all of those choices in place of the parents 
so long as members of boards of education sincerely believe 
that what they are doing is right, which authority in favor of 
boards of education effectively disenfranchises parents; the 
Order creates an incredible situation which allows students 
from e.g., Davis County to attend West High, at the expense of 
the Davis County School District, but forces a student living 
within walking distance of West High to be bussed across town 
to East High; and the Order is the result of an arbitrary and 
capricious decision on the part of the Board because it does 
not meet the criteria prescribed by Section 53-6-20 and 
constitutes Gerrymandering. 
ARGUMENT 
This case presents a classic clash between the powers 
of the State to control and regulate public schools, and the 
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individual rights of parents and students who are patrons of 
the public schools. Plaintiffs contend that the Order is 
contrary to the "fundamental principles. . .essential to the 
2 
security of individual rights" in violation of the Utah 
Constitution and Utah statutory law. 
POINT I 
THE ORDER CONFLICTS WITH THE LIBERTY OF 
PARENTS TO CONTROL THE EDUCATION OF THEIR 
CHILDREN IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 
7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Judge David K. Winder of the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, in remanding this matter to the 
Salt Lake County District Court, held that "plaintiff is 
correct" "that she has a Constitutional right to make choices 
about how her children are educated," (See page 558.) citing 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Tinker v. Pes Moines 
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. 
Utah Constit. art. I, sec. 27 reads in its entirety as 
follows: "Frequent recurrence to fundamental principals is 
essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government." 
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Nebraska, 26 2 U.S. 390 (1923). The nature of the rights thus 
acknowledged by Judge Winder must, therefore, be understood as 
a predicate to determining if the Order dbrogates those rights 
in violation of the Utah Constitution and Utah laws. 
Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, announced that there must be 
a balance between the powers of the state over public schools 
and the rights of the parent to make reaspnable choices in the 
education of his or her child: 
The state may do much, go very far, indeed, 
in order to improve the quality of its 
citizens, physically, mentally apd morally, 
[it] is clear; but the individual has 
certain fundamental rights whi<bh must be 
respected. Id. at 401. (Emphasis added.) 
The issue in Meyer v. Nebraska was whether the state could 
prohibit the teaching of foreign languages as a measure to 
promote the public good by fostering a "mother tongue." 
Promoting purely social goals went too f|ar, it was held, and 
offended the Fourteenth Amendment provision that "[no] state . 
. . shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law." 
While this court has not attempted to define 
with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, 
the term has received much consideration, 
and some of the included things have been 
definitely stated. Without doubt, it 
denotes not merely freedom firom bodily 
restraint, but also the right of the 
individual to contract, to engage in any of 
the common occupations of life, to acquire 
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useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home 
and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and, generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men • The 
established ^ doctrine is that this liberty 
may not be interfered with, under the guise 
of protecting the public interest, by 
legislative action which is arbitrary or 
without reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the state to 
effect. Determination by the legislature of 
what constitutes proper exercise of police 
power is not final or conclusive, but is 
subject to supervision by the courts. 262 
UoS. 399-400. (Emphasis added, citations 
omitted.) 
The doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska was applied soon 
after it was announced, on facts closer to the matter at bar, 
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. In Pierce, a law of 
the State of Oregon requiring children between 8 and 16 years 
of age to attend the public schools to the exclusion of private 
ones was held unconstitutional. Appropos, the Order's 
assignment of students to achieve admittedly socio-economic 
goals herein, the court declared: 
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we 
think it entirely plain that the [Oregon 
statute] unreasonably interferes with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct 
the upbringing and education of children 
under their control. As often heretofore 
pointed out, rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution may not be abridged by 
legislation which has no reasonable relation 
to some purpose within the competency of the 
state. The fundamental theory of liberty 
upon which all governments in this Union 
repose excludes any general power of the 
state to standardize its children by forcing 
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them to accept instruction from public 
teachers only. The child is not the mere 
creature of the state; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations. 268 
U.S. 534-35. (Emphasis added, citations 
omitted.) 
Those propositions were reaffirmed by the modern Court 
in Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community School District, 
supra, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra. In Yoder, Amish parents 
challenged state control of the educatio|n of their children, 
albeit on First Amendment grounds. Justice Burger observed 
that the case was "not one in which any hajrm to the physical or 
mental health of the child or to the plublic safety, peace, 
order or welfare ha[d] been demonstrate4 or may be properly 
inferred" (406 U.S. 230, citations omitted) and then confirmed 
the very rights of parents asserted hereinj: 
The history and culture of western 
civilization reflect a strong tradition of 
parental concern for the nurture and 
upbringing of their children. Tnis primary 
role of the parents in the upbringing of 
their children is now established beyond 
debate as an enduring American tradition. 
If not the first, perhaps the most 
significant statements of the Co^ irt in this 
area are found in Pierce v. [Society of 
Sisters, in which the Court observed (citing 
the dicta guoted above). . . . 
However read, the Court's holding in Pierce 
stands as a charter of the rights of parents 
to direct the religious upbringing of their 
children. And, when the interests of 
parenthood are combined with a frfee exercise 
claim of the nature revealed by tjiis record, 
more than merely a "reasonable relation" to 
some purpose within the competency of the 
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state is required to sustain the validity of 
the State's requirement under the First 
Amendment. To be sure, the power of the 
parent, even when linked to a free exercise 
claim, may be subject to limitation under 
Pierce if it appears that parental decisions 
will jeopardize the health or safety of the 
child, or have a potential for significant 
social burdens. 
* * * 
In the face of our consistent emphasis on 
the central values underlying the Religion 
Clauses in our constitutional scheme of 
government, we cannot accept a parens 
patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope 
and with such sweeping potential for broad 
and unforeseeable application as that urged 
by the State. 406 U.S. 232-34. (Emphasis 
added.) 
We submit that the same principles apply herein, 
particularly in view of the language of Utah Constitution 
Article I, section 7, which reads: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Our court held long ago that this due process clause 
is so similar to the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, that the 
decisions of the federal Supreme Court are highly persuasive as 
to the application and meaning of the above-quoted section 7. 
Untermeyer v. State Tax Comm., 102 U. 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942). 
Thus, the liberty guaranteed to parents with respect to the 
education of their children as described and protected by the 
federal decisions cited above and by our Article I, section 7, 
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are the same. In other words, the Board cannot do in violation 
of the Utah Constitution what other goverpment agencies cannot 
do in violation of the federal Constitution. 
More specifically, the principle articulated by Yoder 
in its reliance on Pierce and Meyer easily apply to the case at 
bar. Although here the Board did not decree that the children 
of plaintiffs must attend public schools, the Board did decree 
that if they do choose to attend public? schools, they must 
attend a particular public school not in their neighborhood or 
convenient to them. Contrary to the Boardf|S assumption that its 
power is plenary, Yoder, Pierce and Mey^r all stand for the 
proposition that the Board may enforce a binding decision only 
if such decision has a "reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the State." Ibidj. 
For purposes of this case, what is within the 
competency of the state is defined at Article I, section 7 and 
Article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution and at Utah Code 
Ann. Section 53-6-20. Plaintiffs contend that the Order is not 
within the competency of the state as so defined, because, by 
the Order, a parent such as the named plaintiff, Mrs. Espinal, 
for example, is denied the choice of a school in her 
neighborhood or convenient to her (see her affidavit at pages 
529-533), while a parent residing on th£ other side of the 
freeway is given that option. Mrs. Espinal and her children 
are denied basic liberties while others are protected in 
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theirs. Certainly that is so if the basis for the denial is an 
arbitrary one — viz., based upon racial, or academic 
achievement, or socio-economic values of others, rather than 
the standards set in the Utah Constitution and the Utah code as 
being within the competency of the Board. 
Mrs. Espinal and her children, and other patrons of 
3 
the District like them, are the victims of Gerrymandering. 
Judge Winder not only acknowledged the rights of parents to 
control their children's education, but he also frankly found 
that the Order "jerimanded" (sic) the attendance zones of the 
District. (See page 546.) His decision thus brings into focus 
the guestion of whether the Utah Constitution and Utah laws 
empower the Board to make such decisions. It is that guestion 
which Judge Winder considered of such importance that it should 
be decided, in the first instance, by a Utah court. Put 
differently, the guestion is: do the parents1 rights to 
educate their children prevail over the Board's decision to 
Gerrymander boundaries to create a social "sameness" in the 
three high schools; or do the Utah Constitution and Utah laws 
protect parents and their children from Gerrymandering to 
accomplish social engineering. Gerrymandering, by definition, 
The term derives from Elbridge Gerry, Governor of 
Massachusetts, who used the method to reshape voting districts 
to his advantage in 1812, and salamander, which resembled the 
shape of the resulting district. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (1961). Board Vice 
President Boyden explained the attendance zones created by the 
Order in terms precise to the definition: 
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amounts to an unnatural and unfair taking of rights from one 
group and giving special advantages to another. The innate 
discrimination of the Gerrymandering resulting from the Order, 
by itself, is sufficient to cause this Court to prohibit 
(footnote continued) 
Q (BY MR. ROBSON) You used the term 
"gerimandering" school boundaries or 
something like that. Could you explain for 
me what you mean when you use the word 
gerimandering or gerimandered? 
A Well, as I understand it, it's a 
southern word that came from the good old 
boys who were trying to stay in office by 
moving their boundaries, and on^ looked so 
much like a salamander that it c^me up with 
the word gerimander. . . . Vfhat you're 
looking at if you look at Exhibit'3, if you 
look at that blue area, that blobk is taken 
out of Highland to feed into East to try to 
compensate for the brown and green areas 
that were going to West because that would 
have left East with the preponderance of low 
achieving students were that chunk not taken 
out. Why is this strip included over here? 
Why didn't the line — why is the red strip 
not attached to West? Because there were 
too many low achieving students ijn that area 
to be attached to West, and they had to 
either go to East or Highland. And there 
were a number of maps which jicjjgled these 
lines around. 
because if 
it makes 
I used the term gerimander 
you look at my voting district 
absolutely no sense whatsoever, ind I think 
that the Salt Lake City Commission figured 
that one out. State legislatur 
all the time. And so our school board used 
that kind of precedent, I suppoge, to move 
these lines around in a willy-nilly fashion. 
They don't follow any geographic boundary 
necessarily. What they are designed to do 
is get these student bodies that have nearly 
the same median equivalent achievement. 
(See pages 772, 773.) 
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enforcement of the Order as a violation of Article I, section 7 
of the Utah Constitution. Surely, no board of education in 
Utah has the unfettered power to deny individual liberties by 
Gerrymandering as has been done by the Order. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER VIOLATES THE ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION4 
OF ARTICLE X, SECTION 8 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION AGAINST PARTISAN TESTS. 
The Utah Constitution, Article X, section 8 provides: 
(footnote continued) 
Vice President Boyden then explained that the boundary of East 
would be truly "serpentine" if the University area, which has 
virtually no students, was disregarded: 
Q (BY MR. LINEBAUGH) So if you take those 
six students on Sunnyside and throw them in 
with all the students, you have in effect 
almost a serpentine description of the East 
High boundary, do you not, given the order? 
A That's correct. 
Q In other words, there is really no 
contiguous alignment for the whole East High 
district other than they line onto each 
other, is that right? 
A Yeah. It snakes through the city. (See 
page 777.) 
Utah Const. Article I, section 26 reads in its entirety as 
follows: "The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory 
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to 
be otherwise." 
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No religious or partisan test or 
qualification shall be required as a 
condition of employment, admission, or 
attendance in the State's education systems. 
We can find no other state constitution cqntaining the language 
of Utah's Article X, section 8, nor c&n we find any cases 
construing the language of section 8* However, by definition, 
many of the students in the District are being subjected to 
partisan considerations to determine whether they can attend 
the high school in their neighborhood or at least closest to 
them. The Universal Dictionary of the English Language 
published in New York by Peter Fenelon Collier and copyrighted 
in 1897, close to the time of the adoption of our Utah 
Constitution, defined the adjective "partisan" pertinently as 
follows: 
Pertaining or attached to a party or 
faction; biased or acting in the interest of 
a party or faction. 
According to that same source, the word "partisan" is derived 
from the Latin root "partitus," which literally means "to 
divide." A partisan test then, is literally a test designed 
to divide persons from each other. Whilje plaintiffs readily 
agree that such tests designed to divide sphool patrons for the 
right reasons, for example, proximity to schools and the affect 
of natural barriers, highways, etc., are clearly acceptable, 
any such tests designed to divide school patrons into factions, 
combinations or cliques based upon biases or interests that 
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favor one group over another, are partisan tests and therefore 
proscribed by the Utah Constitution. 
More currently, The Oxford English Dictionary, in its 
1961 edition, defines the noun "partisan" as follows: 
One who takes part or sides with another; an 
adherent or supporter of a party, person, or 
cause; esp. a devoted or zealous supporter; 
often in unfavorable sense: One who 
supports his party "through thick and thin"; 
a blind, prejudiced, unreasoning, or 
fanatical adherent. 
This same source defines the adjective "partisan" as: 
Of, pertaining to, or characteristic of a 
partisan; supporting a party, esp. zealously 
or blindly; biased, prejudiced, one-sided. 
Similarly, Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary in its 1961 edition, defines the noun "partisan" as 
follows: 
a. one that takes the part of another; an 
adherent to a party, faction, cause, or 
person. . . b. a strong or devoted 
supporter; a zealous advocate. . . c. an 
adherent characterized by prejudiced, 
unreasoning, blind, or fanatical allegiance. 
This same source defines the adjective "partisan" as: 
2: exhibiting, characterized by, or 
resulting from partisanship. . . . 
Although our Supreme Court has not construed the term 
"partisan," our Court has condemned the arbitrary dividing of 
school patrons. Upon consideration of Utah Const., Article X, 
section 1 requiring that Utah public schools be "open," our 
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Court prohibited dividing the students 'linto classes, groups 
and grant[ing], allow[ing], or provid[ing]| one group privileges 
or advantages denied another." Logan School District v. 
Kowallis, 77 P.2d 348, 350 (Utah 1938). 
The agreed fact is that the Boarc} did, precisely, what 
Kowallis held could not be done. According to Board president 
Keith Stepan, the Order divided the students into groups, 
according to race, place of residence, academic achievement and 
socio-economic status, and selected groups were denied 
attendance at the school convenient to them on that basis, 
while others were permitted attendance att the most convenient 
school. (See pages 643-685, 688.) Restrictions imposed by the 
Order plainly do not apply indiscriminately to all of Salt Lake 
City's high school students. Some of those students are 
subjected to busing or transportation according to the 
circumstances of their birth, or whether they are members of a 
particular faction or combination within the community (whether 
favored or unfavored). 
Given the plain meaning of the! term "partisan" as 
defined above, the use of the term "partisan" in Article X, 
section 8 must be held to prohibit the Order. Based on the 
those definitions, a partisan test or Qualification is one 
which requires a group of students to meet biased, prejudiced, 
(discriminatory), one-sided and unreasonable criteria for 
admission to a particular school. For example, for any group 
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residing generally west of the 1-15 freeway and generally south 
of the 1-80 freeway wanting to go to West High, the Order 
imposes the following partisan tests or qualifications for 
attendance at West High: 
1. Your group can't go to West High 
unless it is predominantly non-minority/ 
2. Your group can't go to West High 
unless, as a group, it achieves 
comparatively high academic scores/ and 
3. Your group can't go to West High 
unless it is predominantly of a high social 
and economic class. 
The partisan tests or qualifications imposed on 
students residing generally east of the 1-15 freeway wanting to 
attend East High are just opposite, thus demonstrating the 
partial (as opposed to impartial), partisan nature of the 
Order* For example: 
1. Your group can't go to East High 
unless it is predominantly minority; 
2. Your group can't go to East High 
unless, as a group, it scores comparatively 
low on academic tests; 
3. Your group can't go to East High 
unless it is predominantly of a low social 
and economic class. 
For purposes of this case, a "partisan test or 
qualification" is a test or qualification that denies some 
students (regardless of their personal minority status, 
academic competence or socio-economic class) the right to 
attend the school closest to them because they are included in 
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a particular group, faction or combination defined by race, 
academic achievement or their socio-economic status* Clearly, 
that is what the Order does. Students are denied access to the 
schools closest to them, and unnecessarily and expensively 
bussed across town, because they were ijmlucky enough to be 
included in a group, faction or combination of people in the 
District based upon their race, or because they reside among a 
group which scored too low or too high the day an academic 
achievement test was given, or because they reside among 
families deemed too poor or too rich. Others of the same race, 
having achieved the same academic scores, and/or having the 
same amount of money are permitted to go ^o the school closest 
to them, without the concomitant waste of time and money and 
the deprivation of opportunity for required and extracurricular 
high school programs, inherent in being bupsed across town, for 
no reason better than that they reside artong a group, faction 
or combination of people which has been subjected to partisan 
tests. Dividing school patrons for sucih reasons is surely 
partisanship in its "unfavorable" sense. 
It has been said that if anyone Aries to convince you 
of the importance of ideas over the importance of individual 
rights, that person is usually talking about his ideas and your 
rights. That the Order was a result of partisan ideas, in 
other words that the Order was a result of biased, prejudicial, 
discriminatory, one-sided and unreasonable tests and 
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considerations, imposed by a majority of the Board, is best 
illustrated by understanding what the Order says to Mrs* 
Espinal and her children and the District's other high school 
patrons residing in the Euclid area. 
As is clear from the Statement of Facts herein, the 
Order excludes the Euclid area from the West High boundary, and 
requires the high school students in that area to travel across 
town to attend East High. This, in spite of the fact that high 
school students from the Euclid area were previously included 
in the West High boundary, and in spite of the fact that all 
such students live closer to West High than they do to East 
High. 
What does the Order say to the Euclid area students 
and their families denied access to West High? What message is 
given to them as they are bussed across town to attend East 
High? Any way we look at it, the Order tells everyone that 
those students are being swapped for high achieving, "waspish" 
and supposedly higher class students from the east side of Salt 
Lake City. (See page 773.) 
The hard reality is that the Order says to those 
students removed from West High, and their families, that: 
You have to go to East High because you are 
poor achievers — you and your neighbors 
didn't score high enough when we gave the 
tests/ and 
You have to go to East High because too many 
of you are members of an ethnic minority; 
and 
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We have to exchange you for those rich high 
achievers from the east side because 
socio-economically you are poorer and we 
have to have more high-class people with 
more money at West High; and 
You have to go to East High because you come 
from families who won't or can't give West 
High the "critical mass" of good students it 
needs; therefore, what we are really doing 
is swapping you for a better class of 
families — but don't take it personally; or 
Forget about what is best for West High, the 
school which has your allegiance and 
affection, we are really sending you to East 
High for your own good, and every day we are 
going to put you on a bus that will pick you 
up within walking distance of West High and 
will take you across town to East High, and 
then after school, on an extra-curricular 
basis, you can continue in the worthy effort 
of trying to make a cohesive school with 
your fellow students, provided you don't 
miss your bus home. 
By the Order, a majority of the Board has clearly told 
these dislocated students that they are being required to leave 
West High because they don't have enough educational quality. 
Since when did lack of educational quality justify the 
imposition of biased, prejudicial, discriminatory, one-sided 
and unreasonable tests to determine whether students get to 
attend their neighborhood public school of choice? 
Plaintiffs concede it is uncomfortable to face the 
reality of what has been done to the District's patrons in the 
Euclid area. It makes us squirm, because frankly, the messages 
from the Order are terribly offensive. However, as 
uncomfortable as such considerations make us, far worse is the 
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emotional cruelty inflicted upon the patrons expelled from the 
West High community, their school of preference, for such 
untenable reasons. The dehumanizing result of the Order is 
that it inflicts upon the patrons of the Euclid area the pain 
and bitterness that surely comes from knowing that the 
unembellished reason for moving them is that they are not 
wanted* At least, the students being moved by the Order from 
East High to West High can make the move with the assurance 
that they are wanted and that their educational quality is 
sought after. 
The patrons of the Euclid area became a bartering chip 
to implement an idea in the minds of a majority of the Board, 
and thus they had imposed upon them biased, prejudicial, 
discriminatory, one-sided and unreasonable tests, i.e., 
partisan tests, which tests and considerations are proscribed 
by Article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution. Precisely 
because of their lower economic status and their lower 
achievement levels, the injury to them is magnified, since they 
are least able to afford the consequences of the Order. That 
relatively small group removed from West High (not because they 
were viewed as desirable someplace else, but because they were 
viewed as undesirable at West High) cannot depend on the 
political process to protect them. Consequently, they look to 
this Court to insure their access to the public high school of 
their choice, the public high school closest and most 
convenient to them. 
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POINT III 
THE ORDER IS NOT WITHIN THE BOARD'S POWERS 
AS LIMITED BY UTAH STATUTORY LAW. 
The Board's justification for the Order also fails as 
a matter of statutory construction. The powers of the Board 
are enumerated in careful detail at Utah Code Ann. section 
53-6-20. For the convenience of the Court, that section is 
quoted here in its entirety: 
Every local board may: 
(1) spend minimum school program funds for 
programs and activities for which the State 
Board of Education has established minimum 
standards or rules under Section 53-2-12.1/ 
(2) purchase, sell, and make improvements 
on school sites, buildings, and equipment 
and construct, erect, and furnish school 
buildings. School sites or buildings may 
only be conveyed or sold on board resolution 
affirmed by at least two-thirds of the 
members; 
(3) participate in the joint construction 
or operation of a school attended by 
children in the district and children 
residing in adjoining districts either 
within or outside the state. The agreement 
for joint operation or construction of a 
school shall be signed by the president of 
the board of each participating district, 
include a mutually agreed upon pro rata 
cost, and be filed with the State Board of 
Education; 
(4) establish, locate, and maintain 
kindergarten, elementary, secondary, and 
vocational schools. Children seeking to 
enter school must be at least five years of 
age before September 2 of the year in which 
admission is sought; 
(5) establish and support school libraries 
and authorize, and pay for out of district 
funds, a compilation of the history of the 
district; 
-31-
(6) collect damages for the loss, injury, 
or destruction of school property; 
(7) engage in guidance and counseling 
services for children and their parents 
prior to enrollment of the children in 
school; 
(8) apply for, receive and administer funds 
made available through the programs of the 
Federal Government* Federal funds are not 
considered funds within the school district 
budget under Chapter 20 of Title 53 • 
Federal funds are expended for the purposes 
for which they are received and are 
accounted for by the Board. 
(9) organize school safety patrols and 
adopt rules under which the patrols promote 
student safety. A student appointed to a 
safety patrol shall be age 11 or over, or 
age ten or over in elementary schools that 
do not include a sixth grade, and shall have 
written parental consent for the 
appointment. Safety patrol members shall 
not direct vehicular traffic or be stationed 
in the portion of the highway intended for 
vehicular traffic use. No liability shall 
attach either to the school district, the 
board of education, an individual board 
member, a parent of a safety patrol member, 
an authorized volunteer assisting the 
program, or other school authority by virtue 
of the organization, maintenance, or 
operation of a school safety patrol; 
(10) on its own behalf, or on behalf of an 
educational institution for which the board 
is the direct governing body, accept private 
grants, loans, gifts, endowments, devises or 
bequests which are made for educational 
purposes. These contributions are not 
subject to appropriation by the Legislature; 
(11) appoint and fix the compensation of a 
compliance officer to issue citations for 
violations of Subsection 76-10-105(2). A 
person may not be appointed to serve as a 
compliance officer without the person's 
consent. A teacher or student may not be 
appointed as a compliance officer. 
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(12) adopt bylaws and rules for its own 
procedures; 
(13) make and enforce rules necessary for 
the control and management of the district 
schools. All board rules and policies shall 
be in writing, filed, and referenced for 
public access; and 
(14) do all things necessary for the 
maintenance, prosperity, and success of the 
schools and the promotion of education. 
A. The Board's Powers are Limited by the 
Enumeration at Section 53-6-20. 
Allen v. Board of Education, 120 Utah 566, 236 P.2d 
756 (1951) held that a school board has "only such powers as 
are expressly conferred upon it and such implied powers as are 
necessary to execute and carry into effect its express powers." 
(Emphasis added.) 
B. "Catchall" Powers are Limited by the 
Doctrine Ejusdem Generis. 
The broad language of Utah Code Ann. Section 
53-6-20(14), declaring that 
(14) (Every local board may) do all things 
necessary for the maintenance, prosperity, 
and success of the schools and the promotion 
of education. 
does not mean that the Board may act to achieve social 
objectives, such as a racial, academic achievement or 
socio-economic mix in the schools. The generality of such 
language, preceded by a specific enumeration of powers, is 
uniformly limited by the doctrine ejusdem generis. See BLACKS 
LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951): 
-33-
In the construction of laws, wills, and 
other instruments, the "ejusdem generis 
rule" is, that where general words follow an 
enumeration of persons or things, by words 
of a particular and specific meaning, such 
general words are not to be construed in 
their widest extent, but are to be held as 
applying only to persons or things of the 
same general kind or class as those 
specifically mentioned. 
Ricker v. Board of Education, 16 U.2d 106, 396 P.2d 
416 (1964) held that the Board's "broad latitude" must be 
exercised "within the sphere of its responsibilities" Id. 420. 
See also, Logan City School District v. Kowallis, 94 U. 342, 77 
P.2d 348 (1938). In what may be the definitive pronouncement 
on the subject, Allen v. Board of Education, 120 U. 566, 236 
P.2d 756 (1951) split with Hansen v. Board of Education, 116 
P. 2d 936 (Utah 1941) on the issue of whether the closing of 
schools was implied by the power to "establish, locate and 
maintain" them. In overruling the holding of Hansen, the Utah 
court relied upon the ejusdum generis concept. Allen, supra at 
763. The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Chief Judge of the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, has held in a 
closely related context, that "courts should read the 
questioned statute (viz., defining the powers of the school 
board) in the context of other, similar laws on the same 
subject." Downy v. Burningham, F.Supp. (Docket No., 
C83-1004J, U.S.CD., D. Utah 1983). To accept the proposition 
that the Board has plenary power, this Court must conclude that 
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the Legislature did a senseless, meaningless thing by the 
foregoing enumeration of specific powers if subdivision (14) 
confers plenary authority upon the Board. 
C, "Catchall" Powers must be "Necessary". 
The catchall powers conferred by subdivision (14) is 
further qualified by the requirement that whatever is done be 
"necessary" for the maintenance, prosperity and success of the 
schools. Accepted maxims of construction require that a 
considered use of the term "necessary" be given its ordinary 
and accepted meaning. It cannot be construed as a grant of 
discretionary authority to do anything though desirable as a 
societal end, unless necessary to the maintenance of the 
schools. 
Significantly, there is nothing in the record to 
establish any such determination, nor could there be. The 
statute requires more than an opinion that the Order is favored 
by some. Even if one accepts that a racial, academic or 
socio-economic mix is desirable, it is not necessary --
certainly not to the maintenance of the schools. Both District 
Assistant Superintendent John Keegan and Board Vice-President 
Steve Boyden categorically testified that the Order was not 
"necessary" to any purpose specified at Utah Code Ann. Section 
53-6-20. (See pages 617-627, 766.) 
The plain meaning of the terms employed by the 
Legislature thus prohibit the Order. 
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D#
 Parental Rights to Make Reasonable 
Selections of Schools their Children 
will Attend are Preserved by Utah Law, 
The proposition that the generality of subdivision 
(14) vests the Board with sweeping powers over student 
assignments, including assignment for purposes unrelated to the 
specific powers enumerated in the thirteen preceding 
subdivisions, ignores the fundamental rights of parents to make 
reasonable choices in the education of their children in the 
public school system, Meyer v, Nebraska, supra, recognized 
that: 
The American people have always regarded 
education and acguisition of knowledge as 
matters of supreme importance, which should 
be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 
1787 declares: "Religion, morality and 
knowledge being necessary to good government 
and the happiness of mankind, schools and 
the means of education shall forever be 
encouraged. Corresponding to the right of 
control, it is the natural duty of the 
parent to give his children education 
suitable to their station in life; and 
nearly all the states, including Nebraska, 
enforce this obligation by compulsory laws, 
262 U.S. 401. (Emphasis added.) 
See also, Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra; Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, supra. 
In construing the intention of the Legislature which 
adopted Utah Code Ann. Section 53-6-20, and whether subdivision 
(14) invests the Board with plenary authority over student 
assignments, it is important to consider that numerous 
provisions in Utah law confer rights on the parent respecting 
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the choice of what school a child shall attend. The parent has 
the right to select a private school rather than a public one. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 53-24-1. There is a right to attend 
school in another district in the State, Utah Code Ann. Section 
53-4-16, or to attend school outside of the state, and in 
either instance and have the district of his or her residence 
pay the necessary tuition, Utah Code Ann. Section 53-4-17. A 
child residing outside the state may elect to attend school 
within a state district, Utah Code Ann. Section 53-1-18(1). A 
school board could adopt rules, including rules restricting the 
rights of the parent, but only if "necessary" to the control 
and management of the schools. Utah Code Ann. Section 
53-6-20(13). 
Further, it is obvious from other provisions that the 
Legislature intended that a student have the right to attend a 
school close to his place of residence. Each county must 
include at least one school district, Utah Code Ann. Section 
53-4-1, and cities of the first and second class may constitute 
separate school districts. Ibid. Clearly, the wisdom of those 
provisions is, as Kowallis declared, that a student be afforded 
a school close to his or her residence. That intent is also 
made clear by the provision excusing a minor from attending a 
school located more than 2.5 miles from his residence, at least 
if free transportation is not provided. Utah Code Ann. Section 
53-24-1.2(b)(iv). 
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The Utah court in fact held, in Kowallis, supra, that 
children have the right, subject only to limitations that are 
reasonable and necessary, to attend the school that is 
convenient to them: 
There shall be provided, for each child in 
the state, a school suitable to its 
development and training, and as reasonably 
convenient for attendance as is practicable, 
which school such child shall have a right 
to attend, 77 P.2d 351. (Emphasis added.) 
In so holding, Kowallis confirmed a school board's right to 
charge tuition to a student from a neighboring district, 
because a convenient school was provided near the childfs 
residence. It would be incongruous, to be sure, if this Court 
now denied the right to attend the convenient school as well. 
We note that the trial court concluded that 
"necessary"1 simply means whatever the Board concludes is 
necessary. (See pages 1053, 1054.) That is another way of 
saying that if a majority of the Board sincerely believes that 
what they are doing is necessary, then what they do does not 
have to pass statutory or constitutional muster. History is 
replete with examples of officials who sincerely believed that 
what they were doing was necessary for somebody else, but 
history also proves that they were sincerely wrong. 
Any high school students in the District, and 
particularly those in the Euclid area, who are forced to go 
across town to the high school not closest to them and not of 
-38-
their choosing, and who were selected for such treatment for 
the reasons admitted by the Board, are certainly among those 
disenfranchised students that Article I, section 7 and Article 
X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution and section 56-6-20 are 
designed to protect from an illegal rule adopted by a Utah 
school board. The decision of this Court in Berry v, Beech 
Aircraft, 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985) makes it clear that the 
Board does not have plenary power to do whatever a majority of 
the Board decides is desirable, regardless of how well 
intentioned the majority may be. Construing the Open Courts 
clause of the Utah Constitution, and its limitations on the 
power of the Legislature, the Court held as follows: 
Necessarily, the Legislature has great 
latitude in defining, changing, and 
modernizing the law, and in doing so may 
create new rules of law and abrogate old 
ones. Nevertheless, the basic purpose of 
Article I, section 11 is to impose some 
limitation on that power for the benefit of 
those persons who are injured in their 
persons, property, or reputations since they 
are generally isolated in society, belong to 
no identifiable group, and rarely are able 
to rally the political process to their aid. 
What was said in Beech about the limitations on the power of 
the Legislature, is certainly applicable to the power of the 
Board, particularly given the limitations expressed by the 
word "necessary" contained in the Board's enabling statute. 
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E« The Order Defies Logic. 
This Court should also consider the paradox presented 
by the Order when compared with the statutory scheme described 
above. The Order creates the anomolous situation where a 
student living, for example, in Davis County could choose to 
attend West High in the District on a space available basis at 
the expense of the Davis County District, but a student living 
in the Euclid area within walking distance of West High could 
not attend West High because of such student's racial, academic 
or socio-economic status. The Order reaches just such an 
incredible result. Likewise, a resident of the Nevada side of 
Wendover has the right to attend any school in Tooele County, 
subject only to space availability, but based upon the 
rationale of the Order, a resident of the Utah side of the same 
city would have no corresponding right to choose to attend the 
most convenient school in Tooele County. 
We can agree that the Legislature intended that school 
boards have broad discretion, but not that they run roughshod 
over the reasonable choices of the parent in educating his or 
her child. The powers of the Board, we submit, are limited for 
the purpose of preserving the correlative rights of the parent, 
and the scope of the limitation is indicated by the powers 
enumerated at Utah Code Ann. Section 53-6-20. Those powers are 
largely concerned with the establishment of physical facilities 
and the conduct of educational pursuits within them. The 
catchall provision of subdivision (14) plainly says that the 
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Board may do anything else "necessary" to the enumerated 
powers, but nothing in that enumeration confers, or implies, 
the power to determine what racial, academic, or socio-economic 
mix is desirable in the District, nor is such a determination 
"necessary," in any sense, to the enumerated powers. 
F. The Order is an Arbitrary Abuse of the 
Board's Discretion, 
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint alleges that 
the Order is arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion* (See paragraph 43 on page 16.) 
Webster defines "arbitrary" as being "based on one's 
preference, motive or whim." A "capricious" decision is one 
that is "changeable, fickle, fanciful." Plaintiffs contend 
that, in the context of this case, any decision by the Board is 
also arbitrary and capricious if not based upon the criterion 
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. Section 53-6-20. Both terms apply 
to the Order which was not the result of natural geographical 
divisions, neighborhood alignments, physical barriers such as 
major roadways or commercial districts, political subdivisions 
or other features that would be considered fair and natural. 
The "Gerrymandered" scheme of transporting pockets of 
students across the natural divisions to schools not convenient 
is appropriately described as arbitrary. The low income and 
minority students south and west of the I-15/I-80 interchange 
(many of whom are within walking distance of West High) are 
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removed from West High against their will and selected for 
transportation to East High — not because West High lacks 
facilities for them or because East High is a better school for 
them, and not because they will make East High a better school, 
but to achieve a racial, academic and socio-economic mix 
fitting notions of a majority on the Board about how society 
ought to be ordered* Students north and east of the 13th 
East/I7th South junction (some of whom are within four blocks 
of Highland High) are removed against their will from Highland 
High and assigned to East High — not because Highland High 
lacks facilities for them or because East High is a better 
school for them, and not because they will improve East High, 
but to make room for others who will be arbitrarily transported 
even greater distances from other areas of the District. The 
Utah Legislature has neither directed nor authorized the Board 
to balance our public schools racially, academically or 
according to socio-economics. 
This case is one of the Board assigning students for 
reasons not within its competence, as defined by Utah Code Ann, 
Section 53-6-20. Plaintiffs readily concede that the Board 
might make reasonable assignments, even mandatory ones, for 
reasons of space availability [subdivisions (2), (3), (4) and 
(13)], safety considerations [subdivision (9)], availability of 
funds [subdivision (10)], or because of personnel limitations 
[subdivisions (7) and (11)], or facilities [subdivisions (4) 
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and (5)]. It might do so, as well, for reasons dictated by 
natural barriers, or based upon constitutional considerations 
such as, e.g., segregation. However, if schools are to be 
manipulated for racial, academic achievement or socio-economic 
ends, the competence to do so still resides with the 
Legislature, unless and until it has delegated that authority 
to the school boards. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Order offends 
provisions of the Utah Constitution and laws, the summary 
judgment in favor of the Board should be reversed and the case 
remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, including without 
limitation, directing notice to the Board of the particulars in 
which the Order violates the Utah Constitution and exceeds the 
powers of the Board as granted by the statutes of the State of 
Utah, and giving the Board a reasonable opportunity to rescind 
the Order and develop a voluntary plan consistent with Utah 
law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June 1989. 
Kent B Lmebaugh 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants was mailed, first-class 
postage prepaid, to: 
M. Byron Fisher, Esq. and 
John E.S. Robson, Esq. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this 14th day of June 1989. 
Kent B Linebaugh 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIA ESPINAL, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF 
EDUCATION, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-88-1444 
The issue to be decided by this Court is: Does Utah Code 
Ann., Section 53-6-20, authorize the Salt Lake Board of Education 
to set school boundaries in such a way as to achieve a "balanced 
mix of resident high, middle and low achieving students?" The 
issue is a critical one because it delineates the balance between 
the rights of parents to control the education of their children 
and the power of the state to operate a public education system. 
At the beginning, it is important to say that this case does 
not involve a scheme to reduce the impact of prior racial 
discrimination. The segregation cases from the federal courts 
are, therefore, inapplicable. All of the federal claims have 
been dismissed. The only issue at bench is the power of the 
school board under the state statute. 
The legislature has provided that boards of education shall 
have the following powers: 
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Every local board may: 
(1) spend minimum school program funds for 
programs and activities for which the State 
Board of Education has established minimum 
standards or rules under Section 53-2-12.1; 
(2) purchase, sell, and make improvements on 
school sites, buildings, and equipment and 
construct, erect, and furnish school 
buildings. School sites or buildings may 
only be conveyed or sold on board resolution 
affirmed by at least two-thirds of the 
members; 
(3) participate in the joint construction or 
operation of a school attended by children in 
the district and children residing in 
adjoining districts either within or outside 
the state. The agreement for joint operation 
or construction of a school shall be signed 
by the president of the board of each 
participating district, include a mutually 
agreed upon pro rata cost, and be filed with 
the State Board of Education; 
(4) establish, locate, and maintain 
kindergarten, elementary, secondary, and 
vocational schools. Children seeking to 
enter school must be at least five years of 
age before September 2 of the year in which 
admission is sought; 
(5) establish and support school libraries 
and authorize, and pay for out of district 
funds, a compilation of the history of the 
district; 
(6) collect damages for the loss, injury, or 
destruction of school property; 
(7) engage in guidance and counseling 
services for children and their parents prior 
to enrollment of the children in school; 
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(8) apply for, receive, and administer funds 
made available through the programs of the 
Federal Government. Federal funds are not 
considered funds within the school district 
budget under Chapter 20 of Title 53. Federal 
funds are expended for the purposes for which 
they are received and are accounted for by 
the Board. 
(9) organize school safety patrols and adopt 
rules under which the patrols promote student 
safety. A student appointed to a safety 
patrol shall be age 11 or over, or age ten or 
over in elementary schools that do not 
include a sixth grade, and shall have written 
parental consent for the appointment. Safety 
patrol members shall not direct vehicular 
traffic or be stationed in the portion of the 
highway intended for vehicular traffic use. 
No liability shall attach either to the 
school district, the board of education, an 
individual board member, a parent of a safety 
patrol member, an authorized volunteer 
assisting the program, or other school 
authority by virtue of the organization, 
maintenance or operation of a school safety 
patrol; 
(10) on its own behalf, or on behalf of an 
educational institution for which the board 
is the direct governing body, accept private 
grants, loans, gifts, endowments, devises or 
bequests which are made for educational 
purposes. These contributions are not 
subject to appropriation by the Legislature; 
(11) appoint and fix the compensation of a 
compliance officer to issue citations for 
violations of Subsection 76-10-105(2). A 
person may not be appointed to serve as a 
compliance officer without the person1s 
consent. A teacher or student may not be 
appointed as a compliance officer. 
(12) adopt bylaws and rules for its own 
procedures; 
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(13) make and enforce rules necessary for the 
control and management of the district 
schools. All board rules and policies shall 
be in writing, filed, and referenced for 
public access; and 
(14) do all things necessary for the 
maintenance, prosperity, and success of the 
schools and the promotion of education. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 53-6-20. 
In this statute the legislature empowers boards of education 
to establish and locate schools. And in the final clause the 
boards are given authority to "do all things necessary for the 
maintenance, prosperity; and success of the schools and the 
promotion of education." 
Obviously, it is "necessary" that boundary lines between 
schools are drawn. The question is whether in drawing those 
boundaries social, economic and racial balancing can be taken 
into consideration. Plaintiffs characterize this as "social 
engineering,," and allege that it is beyond the "necessary" powers 
of the school board. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar problem in 1932 
when the power of schools to provide extra-curricular activities 
was challenged. In Beard v. Board of Education of North Summit 
School District, 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900 (1932), the court 
articulated the following principle: 
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The board of education, being a creation of 
the Legislature, has only such powers as are 
expressly conferred upon it and such implied 
powers as are necessary to execute and carry 
into effect its express powers.... The court 
is not concerned with the policy, expediency, 
wisdom, or justice of a legislative enactment 
conferring powers on boards of education of 
school districts, and where such authorities 
act within their powers, in the absence of a 
clear abuse, the courts will sustain the 
exercise of such power. 
81 Utah at 60. 
The statute now in effect still does not specifically 
empower boards of education to provide for extracurricular 
activities; but certainly it has been accepted that school 
dances, parties, football games and the like are a legitimate 
part of the educational process. It can be argued that they are 
not "necessary for the maintenance, prosperity, and success of 
the schools"; indeed it may be argued that teaching of any 
subject beyond reading, writing and arithmetic is not 
"necessary." 
The point is: it is not for the court to substitute its 
judgment for the judgment of the elected board of education. As 
the court said in Beard, "the question for determination is one 
of power rather than of policy." 
When the statute says that the boards have authority to do 
what is "necessary" to promote education, it means "necessary" in 
the opinion of the board; not "necessary" in the opinion of the 
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court. The court must sustain the action of the board if under 
any reasoncible view the function in question can be considered 
"necessary." 
The balancing of the student body along social, racial and 
economic lines can be defended as a legitimate part of the 
educational process. Certainly* the Board may believe that 
students get a better educational experience in such an 
environment. Plaintiffs and many others may disagree; but their 
remedy is at the ballot box, not in the courts. 
Plaintiffs' further argument that the order creates a 
partisan qualification for attendance at the schools is also 
without merit in my opinion. The plain language of that 
constitutional provision clearly does seem intended to apply to 
this situation. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. I request 
that Mr. Robson prepare an appropriate Order. 
Dated this / day of December, 1988. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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